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Games in coalitional form

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Author

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  • Weber, Robert J.

Abstract

This chapter has had two principal purposes. One was to develop the idea of the "coalitional function" of a cooperative game as a means of abstracting from given settings (pure exchange economies, strategic-form games, political games, and the like) the possibilities available to the various coalitions through player cooperation. The other was to present several classes of games (market games, simple games, convex games, symmetric games) on which attention will be focused in subsequent chapters, and to provide several tools (covers and extensions, contractions and reductions, and the like) which will be useful in further analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Weber, Robert J., 1994. "Games in coalitional form," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 36, pages 1285-1303, Elsevier.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:2-36
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shellshear, Evan, 2011. "Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 410, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Mihara, H. Reiju, 2004. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 329-341, November.
    3. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2011. "Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 150-158, March.
    4. Michele Aleandri & Marco Dall’Aglio & Vito Fragnelli & Stefano Moretti, 2022. "Minimal winning coalitions and orders of criticality," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 787-803, November.
    5. Masahiro Kumabe & H. Reiju Mihara, 2008. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 621-640, December.
    6. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 348-366, February.
    7. Stéphane Rottier & Francis Bloch, 2002. "Agenda control in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 769-788.
    8. Ehud Lehrer, 2009. "A new integral for capacities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(1), pages 157-176, April.
    9. László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Reiner Wolff, 2007. "Eine spieltheoretische Analyse des Länderfinanzausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 27(1), pages 89-101, February.
    11. Fatma Aslan & Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020. "Non-cohesive TU-games: Efficiency and Duality," Working Papers CIE 138, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

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