Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games). It shows that (i) games with a finite carrier are computable, (ii) computable games have both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any conceivable notion of anonymity, including finite anonymity and measurebased anonymity. The paper argues that computable games are excluded from the intuitive class of gnice h infinite games, employing the notion of ginsensitivity h \-equal treatment of any two coalitions that differ only on a finite set.
|Date of creation:||31 Oct 2003|
|Date of revision:||01 Jun 2004|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Mac OS X; pages: 15; To appear in Mathematical Social Sciences figures: None|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
References listed on IDEAS
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