Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and only if in Weglorz' model there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.
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- H. Reiju Mihara, 1997.
"Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 503-512.
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"Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 543-553.
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"Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability,"
9408001, EconWPA, revised 23 Aug 1994.
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