Anonymity in Large Societies
In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur "equal size" coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, provided the measure space is sufficiently rich in coalitions of the same measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characterization of preference aggregation rules.
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