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Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

  • Susumu Cato

    ()

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-012-0677-z
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Article provided by Springer & The Society for Social Choice and Welfare in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 41 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 169-202

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:169-202
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0677-z
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  1. Amartya Sen, 1996. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1766, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
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  14. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MICHEL, Philippe, 1997. "Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion," CORE Discussion Papers 1997004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
  16. Juan Dubra & Fabio Maccheroni & Efe Oki, 2001. "Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 11-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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  25. Susumu Cato, 2012. "Szpilrajn, Arrow And Suzumura: Concise Proofs Of Extension Theorems And An Extension," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 235-249, 05.
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  29. Fishburn, Peter C., 1970. "Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 103-106, March.
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