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Conditions on social-preference cycles

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  • Susumu Cato

Abstract

Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory 21:28–45, 1979 ) and Schwartz (J Econ Theory 137:688–695, 2007 ). Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Susumu Cato, 2015. "Conditions on social-preference cycles," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 1-13, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:79:y:2015:i:1:p:1-13
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andreu Mas-Colell & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 185-192.
    2. Truchon M., 1996. "Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 55-55, February.
    3. Ferejohn, John A. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1979. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 28-45, August.
    4. Weber, James S, 1993. "An Elementary Proof of the Conditions for a Generalized Condorcet Paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 415-419, October.
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    7. Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1993. "Acyclicity and the Dispersion of the Veto Power," Papers 9317, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
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    12. Schwartz, Thomas, 2007. "A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 688-695, November.
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    15. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
    16. Sanver, M. Remzi & Selçuk, Özer, 2010. "A characterization of the Copeland solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 354-355, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting mechanism; Social-preference cycle; Voting paradox; Decisiveness; Generalization; D71; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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