Conditions on social-preference cycles
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More about this item
KeywordsVoting mechanism; Social-preference cycle; Voting paradox; Decisiveness; Generalization; D71; D72;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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