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Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules

  • Cato, Susumu

Suzumura consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weak-order extension. This paper provides some remarks on collective choice rules that generate Suzumura consistent social preferences. We examine the properties of such collective choice rules by introducing a procedural condition on collective choice rules. As applications of the procedural condition, we first investigate the decisive structure of a Paretian collective choice rule, and then consider the assignment of individual rights. In our analysis, the concept of semi-decisiveness works effectively.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 40-47

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:1:p:40-47
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Susumu Cato, 2012. "Szpilrajn, Arrow And Suzumura: Concise Proofs Of Extension Theorems And An Extension," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 235-249, 05.
  2. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
  3. Donald J. Brown, 1973. "Acyclic Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 360, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2009. "Quasi-Transitive and Suzumura Consistent Relations," Cahiers de recherche 06-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  5. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont & Kotaro Suzumura, 2005. "Consistent Rationalizability," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(286), pages 185-200, 05.
  6. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules," Cahiers de recherche 09-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  7. Brown, Donald J., 1974. "An approximate solution to Arrow's problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-383, December.
  8. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "Weak independence and veto power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 183-189, February.
  9. Farrell, M J, 1976. "Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 3-10, February.
  10. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2009. "Decisive coalitions and coherence properties," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 427, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  11. Houy, Nicolas, 2008. "A note on the Suzumura-consistency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 90-95, January.
  12. Schwartz, Thomas, 2007. "A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 688-695, November.
  13. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-45, August.
  14. KIRMAN, Alan P. & SONDERMANN, Dieter, . "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and indivisible dictators," CORE Discussion Papers RP -118, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
  16. Cato, Susumu, 2012. "A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 46-48.
  17. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2010. "Consistency, Choice, and Rationality," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, number 9780674052994.
  18. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
  19. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1978. "On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 329-42, June.
  20. Brown, Donald J, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 456-69, August.
  21. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-90, November.
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