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A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules

Author

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  • BOSSERT, Walter
  • SUZUMURA, Kotaro

Abstract

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.

Suggested Citation

  • BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules," Cahiers de recherche 09-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Weymark, 1984. "Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings," Public Choice, Springer, pages 235-246.
    2. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont & Kotaro Suzumura, 2005. "Consistent Rationalizability," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(286), pages 185-200, May.
    3. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-558, September.
    4. Amartya Sen, 1969. "Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 381-393.
    5. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-390, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2012. "Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 323-334.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 563-579.
    3. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 503-518.
    4. Geir Asheim & Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont & Kotaro Suzumura, 2010. "Infinite-horizon choice functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 1-21.
    5. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2009. "Decisive coalitions and coherence properties," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 427, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 169-202, June.
    7. Susumu Cato, 2015. "Conditions on social-preference cycles," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 1-13.
    8. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
    9. Piggins, Ashley & Duddy, Conal, 2016. "Oligarchy and soft incompleteness," MPRA Paper 72392, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Cato, Susumu, 2013. "Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 40-47.
    11. Susumu Cato, 2012. "Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 869-889, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective Choice Rules; Consistency; Pareto Rule;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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