Product filters, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency
In a seminal contribution, Hansson (1976) demonstrates that the collection of decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter. He goes on to show that if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity as the coherence property imposed on a social relation, the set of decisive coalitions is a filter. We examine the notion of decisiveness with acyclical or Suzumura consistent social preferences and without the assumption that the social relation is reflexive and complete. This leads to a new set-theoretic concept applied to product spaces.
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