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Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Bossert, Walter
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
  • 鈴村, 興太郎
  • スズムラ, コウタロウ

Abstract

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that this impossibility survives under a domain restriction and without completeness. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version and some standard social choice axioms if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship

Suggested Citation

  • Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ, 2010. "Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 484, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:484
    Note: This version: August 17, 2010, The paper was presented at the University of British Columbia, the University of California at Riverside, the International Symposium on Choice, Rationality and Intergenerational Equity in Tokyo, CORE, the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, theWorkshop on Social Choice and Poverty in Siena, the Toulouse Conference on Environmental and Resource Economics and the CEPET Workshop in Honor of Nick Baigent in Udine., Financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Specially Promoted Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan for the Project on Economic Analysis of Intergenerational Issues (grant number 22000001) and from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
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    2. Shino Takayama & Akira Yokotani, 2017. "Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 573-598, March.
    3. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 563-579, October.
    4. Susumu Cato, 2022. "Stable preference aggregation with infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 287-304, August.
    5. Cato, Susumu, 2021. "Preference aggregation and atoms in measures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    6. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2012. "Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice," Cahiers de recherche 09-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    7. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ, 2009. "Decisive coalitions and coherence properties," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 427, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    8. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Hammond, Peter J. & Stern, Nicholas, 2018. "Should We Discount the Welfare of Future Generations? Ramsey and Suppes versus Koopmans and Arrow," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 386, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    9. Susumu Cato, 2020. "Quasi-stationary social welfare functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(1), pages 85-106, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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