Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice
In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that this impossibility survives under a domain restriction and without completeness. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version and some standard social choice axioms if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship
|Date of creation:||Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||This version: August 17, 2010, The paper was presented at the University of British Columbia, the University of California at Riverside, the International Symposium on Choice, Rationality and Intergenerational Equity in Tokyo, CORE, the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, theWorkshop on Social Choice and Poverty in Siena, the Toulouse Conference on Environmental and Resource Economics and the CEPET Workshop in Honor of Nick Baigent in Udine., Financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Specially Promoted Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan for the Project on Economic Analysis of Intergenerational Issues (grant number 22000001) and from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.|
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