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Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice

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Listed author(s):
  • BOSSERT, Walter
  • SUZUMURA, Kotaro

Abstract

We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that explore whether this possibility in the infinite-population context allows for a richer class of social welfare functions in an intergenerational model. Different notions of stationarity formulated for individual and for social preferences are examined.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/8643
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Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2012-08.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-08
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Keywords: Infinite-population social choice; multi-profile social choice; decisiveness; intergenerational choice.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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  1. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2011. "Multi-profile intergenerational social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 493-509, September.
  2. Edward Packel, 1980. "Impossibility results in the axiomatic theory of intertemporal choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 219-227, January.
  3. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2010. "Consistency, Choice, and Rationality," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, number 9780674052994, Spring.
  4. Fishburn, Peter C., 1970. "Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 103-106, March.
  5. Kirman, Alan P. & Sondermann, Dieter, 1972. "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 267-277, October.
  6. Kotaro Suzumura, 2000. "Presidential Address: Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 1-32, 03.
  7. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
  8. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-558, September.
  9. Bengt Hansson, 1976. "The existence of group preference functions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 89-98, December.
  10. John Ferejohn & Talbot Page, 1978. "On the Foundations of Intertemporal Choice," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 60(2), pages 269-275.
  11. Campbell, Donald E., 1990. "Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 414-423, April.
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