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Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence

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  • Susumu Cato

    (The University of Tokyo)

Abstract

Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if an aggregation rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for an aggregation rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective rationality. It is shown that given the Arrovian axioms other than collective rationality, a dictatorship arises if and only if decisiveness coherence is satisfied. Moreover, we introduce weak versions of decisive coherence and examine these implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Susumu Cato, 2018. "Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 305-328, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1085-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1085-1
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