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Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis

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  • Susumu Cato

Abstract

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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  • Susumu Cato, 2012. "Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 869-889, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:4:p:869-889
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0564-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Shino Takayama & Akira Yokotani, 2017. "Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 573-598, March.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2018. "Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 305-328, February.
    3. Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley, 2020. "A note on Murakami’s theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 243-253, August.
    4. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 563-579, October.
    5. Stefano Vannucci, 2022. "Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem," Papers 2210.03200, arXiv.org.
    6. Susumu Cato, 2015. "Weak Independence and Social Semi-Orders," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 311-321, September.
    7. Cato, Susumu, 2017. "Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 28-35.
    8. Susumu Cato, 2016. "Weak independence and the Pareto principle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 295-314, August.
    9. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 265-287, December.
    10. Miller, Alan D. & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "A Behavioral Arrow Theorem," Working Papers WP2012/7, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
    11. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 169-202, June.
    12. Susumu Cato, 2019. "The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 587-601, December.
    13. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 511-527, April.

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