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Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization

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  • Donald Campbell
  • Jerry Kelly

Abstract

There exist social choice rules for which every manipulation benefits everyone. This paper constructs a large variety of rules with this property and provides two characterizations of such rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2014. "Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 329-355, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:329-355
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2003. "A necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson's impossibility theorem with strict non-imposition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8.
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    11. Lensberg, T. & Thomson, W., 1988. "Characterizing The Nash Bargaining Solution Without Pareto-Optimality," RCER Working Papers 136, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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    Cited by:

    1. Qi, Shaofang, 2014. "On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 229-232.

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