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Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007

  • Antoinette Baujard

    ()

    (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes I - Université de Caen)

  • Herrade Igersheim

    (BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR7522 - Université Louis Pasteur - Strasbourg I)

Une expérimentation sur le terrain du vote par approbation et du vote par note a été réalisée lors du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle du 22 avril 2007 dans trois communes françaises, et a concerné plus de 5 000 électeurs. Elle a procuré des informations importantes sur l'attitude des électeurs face aux nouveaux modes de scrutin, sur le rôle des modes de scrutin dans leur façon de voter, et sur leurs préférences électorales. Le rapport final, remis au Centre d'Analyse Stratégique en 2007, présente les analyses tirées des données expérimentales. Les annexes du rapport comprennent notamment les discussions menées lors du séminaire fermé du CAS en juin 2007, ainsi que les réponses aux questions ou objections formulées à cette occasion.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00337290
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  1. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 185-92, April.
  3. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van-Der-Straeten, 2007. "One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study," Working Papers hal-00243055, HAL.
  4. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Utilitarian Collective Choice and Voting," Discussion Papers in Economics 473, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Claude Hillinger, 2005. "The Case for Utilitarian Voting," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 23, pages 295-321.
  7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  8. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
  9. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
  10. Saari, Donald G., 1999. "Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 313-355, August.
  11. Salles, Maurice, 1975. "A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with pareto-transitivity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 110-118, August.
  12. Brams, S.J. & Sanver, R.M., 2003. "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes," Working Papers 03-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  13. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
  14. Charles A. Holt & Lisa R. Anderson, 1999. "Agendas and Strategic Voting," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 622-629, January.
  15. Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February.
  16. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "On the Possibility of Democracy and Rational Collective Choice," Discussion Papers in Economics 429, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  17. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki & Jean-François Laslier & Karine Van-Der-Straeten, 2003. "Le vote par assentiment : une expérience," Working Papers hal-00242959, HAL.
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