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Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

Editor

Listed:
  • Jac C. Heckelman
  • Nicholas R. Miller

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), 2015. "Handbook of Social Choice and Voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15584.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:15584
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781783470723.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William V. Gehrlein, 2006. "Condorcet’s Paradox," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-540-33799-7, August.
    2. Paul D. Carlsen & Jac C. Heckelman, 2016. "State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 781-800, January.
    3. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
    4. Florenz Plassmann & T. Tideman, 2014. "How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 31-75, January.
    5. Mackie,Gerry, 2003. "Democracy Defended," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521827089.
    6. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
    7. Mackie,Gerry, 2003. "Democracy Defended," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521534314.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2016. "Social responsibility, human morality and public policy," Discussion Papers in Economics 16/20, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    2. Maurice Salles, 2017. "Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 535 pages, ISBN 978-110744698-4," Post-Print halshs-02084709, HAL.

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    Book Chapters

    The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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