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Properties and paradoxes of common voting rules

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

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  • Jac C. Heckelman

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman, 2015. "Properties and paradoxes of common voting rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 15, pages 263-283, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 425-434, January.
    2. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    3. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1973. "Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 934-946, September.
    4. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    5. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
    6. Ray, Paramesh, 1973. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(5), pages 987-991, September.
    7. Jac C. Heckelman, 2003. "Probabilistic Borda rule voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 455-468, December.
    8. Donald G. Saari, 2003. "Unsettling aspects of voting theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 529-555, October.
    9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jac C. Heckelman, 2021. "Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 335-346, December.
    2. Marek M. Kaminski, 2018. "Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 441-460, September.

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