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Voces populi and the art of listening

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  • Eivind Stensholt

Abstract

The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles allowing this strategy. Theorems 2, 3, and 4 establish conditions for an anonymous and neutral 3-candidate single-seat election to be monotonic and still avoid this strategy completely. Plurality elections combine these properties; among the others "conditional IRV" gives the strongest challenge to the plurality winner. Conditional IRV is extended to any number of candidates. Theorem 5 is an impossibility of Gibbard-Satterthwaite type, describing 3 specific strategies that cannot all be avoided in meaningful anonymous and neutral elections.
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  • Eivind Stensholt, 2010. "Voces populi and the art of listening," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:2:p:291-317
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0442-0
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    1. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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