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The Single Transferable Vote


  • Nicolaus Tideman


The single transferable vote (STV) is a family of vote-counting procedures that use voters' rankings of candidates as input and achieve proportional representation. This paper compares STV with other types of voting procedures and discusses the history of STV, issues concerning the rules of STV, limitations of various versions of STV, and a new version of STV based on paired comparisons of sets of candidates. Each refinement of STV overcomes a limitation of previous versions but at some cost in either the difficulty of understanding the procedure, the cost of computing the outcome, or both.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolaus Tideman, 1995. "The Single Transferable Vote," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 27-38, Winter.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:27-38
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.27

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aleksei Yu. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2018. "Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach," HSE Working papers WP BRP 194/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Sarwate Anand D. & Checkoway Stephen & Shacham Hovav, 2013. "Risk-limiting Audits and the Margin of Victory in Nonplurality Elections," Statistics, Politics and Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 29-64, January.
    3. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
    4. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Single transferable vote in local and national elections," MPRA Paper 50861, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Mar 2012.
    5. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
    6. Nicolaus Tideman & Daniel Richardson, 2000. "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 13-34, April.
    7. Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
    8. Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
    9. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
    10. Steven, Brams & Markus, Brill, 2018. "The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes," MPRA Paper 89739, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. James Green-Armytage & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2020. "Selecting the runoff pair," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 119-137, January.
    12. James Green-Armytage, 2015. "Direct voting and proxy voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 190-220, June.
    13. Eivind Stensholt, 2010. "Voces populi and the art of listening," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
    14. Dan Alger, 2006. "Voting by proxy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 1-26, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior


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