Manipulability in Restricted Separable Domains
We study a problem where a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences. These subdomains are generated from a partition that identifies, for each voter, her friends, her enemies and the unbiased candidates. We characterize the family of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness and tops-onliness on each of those subdomains.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2011|
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