Voting in small networks with cross-pressure
We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens su¤er from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this e¤ect to their interest.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
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