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Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics

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Listed:
  • Martin J. Osborne
  • Rabee Tourky

Abstract

We study the implications of economies of party size in a model of party formation. We show that when the policy space is one-dimensional, candidates form at most two parties. This result does not depend on the magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals' preferences. It does depend on our assumptions that the policy space is one-dimensional and that uncertainty is absent; we study how modifications of these assumptions affect our conclusions. (JEL: D70, D72) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:5:p:974-1005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 85-114.
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    4. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
    5. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 250-277.
    6. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 927-943.
    7. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 49-87.
    9. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 927-943.
    10. Nicolaus Tideman, 1995. "The Single Transferable Vote," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 27-38.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2015. "Mediocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 32-44.
    2. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 597-608.
    3. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2007. "Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 223-249.
    4. Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2016. "Endogenous party structure," Economics of Governance, Springer, pages 317-351.
    5. Thomas Braendle, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    6. Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Group Formation and Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 595-630, August.
    7. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
    8. Oriana Bandiera & Gilat Levy, 2010. "Diversity and the Power of the Elites inDemocraticSocieties: A Model and a Test," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 018, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    9. Arnaud Dellis, 2013. "The two-party system under alternative voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 263-284, January.
    10. Arghya Ghosh & Kieron Meagher, 2014. "Voting on Infrastructure Investment: The Role of Product Market Competition," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2014-618, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    11. Ghosh, Arghya & Meagher, Kieron, 2015. "The politics of infrastructure investment: The role of product market competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 308-329.
    12. Ronald Peeters & Rene Saran & Ayşe Müge Yüksel, 2016. "Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s Law," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 729-759, October.
    13. Jon Eguia, 2012. "A spatial theory of party formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 549-570.
    14. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    15. Peeters Ronald & Saran Rene & Yuksel Ayse Muge, 2010. "Strategic Party Formation on a Circle," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    16. Pech, Gerald, 2012. "Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 14-22.
    17. Oriana Bandiera & Gilat Levy, 2010. "Diversity and the Power of the Elites inDemocraticSocieties: A Model and a Test," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 018, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    18. Motz, Nicolas, 2016. "How Political Parties Shape Electoral Competition," MPRA Paper 69351, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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