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Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining

In: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

    (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK)

  • Kalyan Chatterjee

    (Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, USA)

  • Tomas Sjöström

    (Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, USA)

Abstract

AbstractWe study a game-theoretic model where three political parties (left, median and right) can form coalitions both before and after the election. Before the election, coalitions can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy platform or a division of rents from office; coalition members are free to break up and join other coalitions after the election. Equilibrium pre-electoral coalitions are not necessarily made up of the most ideologically similar parties, and they form under proportional representation as well as plurality rule. They form not only to avoid splitting the vote, but also because seat-sharing arrangements will influence the post-election bargaining and coalition

Suggested Citation

  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjöström, 2013. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 7, pages 129-181 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814447577_0007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September.
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    7. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
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    11. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 844, The University of Melbourne.
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    15. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
    2. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
    3. Morelli, Massimo & Park, In-Uck, 2016. "Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 90-96.
    4. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2011. "Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 947-985.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bilateral Bargaining; Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining; Political Negotiations; Multilateral Bargaining; Coalitional Bargaining; Arbitration; Dynamic Model of Negotiation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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