IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration

Listed author(s):
  • Daniel Diermeier
  • Pohan Fong
Registered author(s):

    We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter. Policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill. We prove existence and necessary conditions of pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space, any number of players, and any preference profile. In equilibrium, the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration, as voters are induced to protect each other's benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions. The agenda setter, in turn, would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider. The lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration, however, enhances policy efficiency. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/qje/qjr016
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 126 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 947-985

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:2:p:947-985
    Contact details of provider:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2005. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," NBER Working Papers 11495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2009. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1464, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2012. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1446-1476, June.
    5. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2004. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," Working Papers w0043, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    6. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining," Departmental Working Papers 200908, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    7. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2006. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1161-1190, 09.
    8. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo," Wallis Working Papers WP46, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    9. Anesi, Vincent, 2010. "Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
    10. Duggan, John & Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2012. "Dynamic legislative policy making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1653-1688.
    11. Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey, 2012. "The dynamics of distributive politics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 739-777, April.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2010. "Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(4), pages 1511-1575.
    13. Pohan Fong & Daniel Diermeier, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," 2008 Meeting Papers 521, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Diermeier, Daniel & Gailmard, Sean, 2006. "Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 327-350, October.
    15. Brian Knight, 2005. "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1639-1652, December.
    16. James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2008. "Endogenous Presidentialism," NBER Working Papers 14603, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 325-345.
    18. Alessandro Riboni, 2010. "Committees As Substitutes For Commitment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 213-236, 02.
    19. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
    20. Bowen, T. Renee & Zahran, Zaki, 2009. "On Dynamic Compromise," Research Papers 2020, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    21. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2009. "Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 298-303, May.
    22. Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7684 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:2:p:947-985. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)

    or (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.