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Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?

Author

Listed:
  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Georgy Egorov
  • Konstantin Sonin

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2009. "Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 298-303, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:2:p:298-303
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.2.298
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(4), pages 987-1009.
    3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2012. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1446-1476, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15344, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Svetlana Kosterina, 2017. "Ambition, personalist regimes, and control of authoritarian leaders," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 167-190, April.
    3. Aney, Madhav S. & Ko, Giovanni, 2015. "Expropriation risk and competition within the military," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 125-149.
    4. Bove, Vincenzo & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2017. "Political repression in autocratic regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 410-428.
    5. Yaguang Zhang & Sitian Yu & Shengyi Zhang, 2023. "The political economy of imperial power successions in ancient China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 137-166, October.
    6. Milan Zafirovski, 2020. "Indicators of Militarism and Democracy in Comparative Context: How Militaristic Tendencies Influence Democratic Processes in OECD Countries 2010–2016," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 159-202, January.
    7. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2017. "The Prince—or Better No Prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(10), pages 2158-2182, November.
    8. Barseghyan, Levon & Guerdjikova, Ani, 2011. "Institutions and growth in limited access societies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 528-568, March.
    9. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean-Philippe Platteau & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Quran and the Sword," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1772-1820.
    10. Lagerlöf Nils-Petter, 2012. "A Dynamic Theory of Competence, Loyalty and Stability in Dictatorships," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, March.
    11. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Verdier, Thierry, 2020. "The Quran and the Sword: The Strategic Game Between Autocratic Power, the Military and the Clerics," CEPR Discussion Papers 14712, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Barbara Krug & Alexander Libman, 2015. "Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 221-245, June.
    13. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2011. "Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 947-985.
    14. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2015. "The Prince – or better no prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Monash Economics Working Papers 15-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    15. Karl Jandoc & Ruben Juarez, 2017. "Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 327-355, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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