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The Political Economics of Non-democracy

Author

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  • Georgy Egorov
  • Konstantin Sonin

Abstract

We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economics of non-democracies. Dictators face many challenges to their rule: internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, or external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators — hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, running a propaganda campaign, organizing electoral fraud, purging associates and opponents, and repressing citizens — as driven by the desire to maximize the regime's chances of staying in power. We argue that the key to understanding the functioning and ultimately the fate of a nondemocratic regime is the information flows within the regime, and the institutions that govern these information flows.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," NBER Working Papers 27949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27949
    Note: POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Bosco, Davide & Colombo, Luca & Femminis, Gianluca, 2025. "Conflict, information and regime-change," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    2. Esteban Muñoz-Sobrado & Amedeo Piolatto & Antoine Zerbini & Federica Braccioli, 2024. "The taxing challenges of the state: Unveiling the role of fiscal & administrative capacity in development," Working Papers 2024/05, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    3. Kiryl V. Rudy, 2021. "Political tax cycles: Cyclicality of the tax burden in election periods," Journal of Tax Reform, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 7(2), pages 193-205.
    4. Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Sergei Guriev & Andrei Markevich, 2024. "New Russian Economic History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-114, March.
    5. Li, Weijia & Roland, Gérard & Xie, Yang, 2022. "Crony capitalism, the party-state, and the political boundaries of corruption," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 652-667.
    6. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2108, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    7. Ruzzante, Matteo & Pizzimenti, Cristoforo, 2025. "Brigandage and the political legacy of monarchical legitimacy in Southern Italy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
    8. Ricardo Nieva, 2021. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 229-275, May.
    9. Marco M. Sorge, 2025. "Politics, Financial Regulation and Housing Bubbles," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 65-91, January.
    10. Michael Christian Lehmann, 2025. "Migration and informational autocracy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 38(1), pages 1-22, March.
    11. Carlos Di Bonifacio & Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2024. "Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2402, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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