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Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

  • Anesi, Vincent

This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 70 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 488-493

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:488-493
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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  8. Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2005. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," Papers 08-09-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
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  12. Hillas, John, 1990. "On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1365-90, November.
  13. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1465, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
  16. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," Discussion Papers 1466, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
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