A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy
Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizencandidate model of representative democracy.
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