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When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

  • Dhillon, Amrita
  • Lockwood, Ben

This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives. When n is large, "almost all" games can be classified as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n > 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is sufficiently replicated.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 55-75

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:55-75
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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