Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule
In this paper we show, via some simple examples, that also in the class of games we are dealing with, there are perfect equilibria that are not proper and, moreover, some "proper" outcome is not induced by any stable set. Furthermore, we show that the perfect concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Finally, the stable set's conformity to the iterated dominance principle implies the superiority of this solution concept, even in the peculiar class of plurality games.
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998. "Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers 1998034, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
445, David K. Levine.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236
- Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998043. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.