Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule
In this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes is finite. Furthermore, we offer an example (due to Govindan and McLennan) that shows the impossibility of extending such results to a general framework.
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- Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001.
"On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms,"
Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-471, March.
- Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, "undated".
"On the strategic stability of equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
237, David K. Levine.
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