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Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule

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  • DE SINOPOLI, Francesco

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

In this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes is finite. Furthermore, we offer an example (due to Govindan and McLennan) that shows the impossibility of extending such results to a general framework.

Suggested Citation

  • DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998. "Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998034, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
    2. Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-471, March.
    3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    4. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998. "Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Iannantuoni, Giovanna, 2003. "Divided government and dominance solvability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 715-733, November.

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