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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

  • Massimo Bordignon
  • Tommaso Nannicini
  • Guido Tabellini

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

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Paper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 348.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:348
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