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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

  • Massimo Bordignon

    ()

    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

  • Guido Tabellini

    (Università Bocconi)

We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremists voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.

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File URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/Quaderni/ief0087.pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) in its series DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza with number ief0087.

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Length: nn pages 63
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie3:ief0087
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza
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