IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v106y2016i8p2349-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Author

Listed:
  • Massimo Bordignon
  • Tommaso Nannicini
  • Guido Tabellini

Abstract

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Bordignon & Tommaso Nannicini & Guido Tabellini, 2016. "Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2349-2370, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:8:p:2349-70
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20131024
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=oshXK72QXOwr-Oq5ge9DoRNdQdQfpI5M
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=_FgPElFO817M_S4gO0gQoQmcvkuGz7QE
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=NLCGsguS4p_DAo_4Kle4ryFBzSyAegaa
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-1288, June.
    2. Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    3. Imbens, Guido W. & Lemieux, Thomas, 2008. "Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 615-635, February.
    4. Marcos Chamon & Sergio Firpo & João M. P. de Mello & Renan Pieri, 2019. "Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(1), pages 19-38, January.
    5. Riker, William H., 1982. "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 753-766, December.
    6. Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini & Ugo Troiano, 2016. "Do Fiscal Rules Matter?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 1-30, July.
    7. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2013. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 369-398, April.
    8. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
    9. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    10. Fujiwara, Thomas, 2011. "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 6(3–4), pages 197-233, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Massimo Bordignon & Guido Tabellini, 2009. "Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0087, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    2. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Leonzio Rizzo & Alberto Zanardi, 2015. "Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 977-998, December.
    3. Menezes, Aline, 2017. "Do some electoral systems select better politicians than others? Single- vs dual-ballot elections," MPRA Paper 79370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Perez-Vincent, Santiago M., 2023. "A few signatures matter: Barriers to entry in Italian local politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    5. Laurent Bouton & Jorge Gallego & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton, 2022. "Run-off Elections in the Laboratory," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(641), pages 106-146.
    6. Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud, 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1621-1649, September.
    7. Buisseret, Peter, 2017. "Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 494-506.
    8. Stefano Gagliarducci & M. Daniele Paserman, 2012. "Gender Interactions within Hierarchies: Evidence from the Political Arena," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1021-1052.
    9. Barone, Guglielmo & de Blasio, Guido, 2013. "Electoral rules and voter turnout," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 25-35.
    10. Bordignon, Massimo & Nannicini, Tommaso & Tabellini, Guido, 2017. "Single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule: A theoretical analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 123-133.
    11. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2013. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 369-398, April.
    12. Sanz, Carlos, 2017. "The Effect of Electoral Systems on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 689-710, October.
    13. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    14. Caroline Le Pennec, 2020. "Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos," SoDa Laboratories Working Paper Series 2020-05, Monash University, SoDa Laboratories.
    15. Kristof De Witte & Benny Geys, 2015. "Strategic Housing Policy, Migration and Sorting around Population Thresholds," CESifo Working Paper Series 5639, CESifo.
    16. Marco Alberto De Benedetto & Maria De Paola, 2017. "Candidates’ Education and Turnout: Evidence from Italian Municipal Elections," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(1), pages 22-50, February.
    17. Alpino, Matteo & Asatryan, Zareh & Blesse, Sebastian & Wehrhöfer, Nils, 2022. "Austerity and distributional policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 112-127.
    18. Bouton, Laurent & Ogden, Benjamin, 2017. "Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 12374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-1288, June.
    20. Angelo D'Andrea, 2019. "Mayor’s wage and Public procurement," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19125, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:8:p:2349-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.