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Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections

Author

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  • Massimiliano Ferraresi
  • Leonzio Rizzo
  • Alberto Zanardi

Abstract

We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001 to 2007 to empirically test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him, while the rest of the municipalities uses a runoff plurality rule where multiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected, otherwise the use of a single- or double-ballot rule does not make any difference in the policy outcome. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano Ferraresi & Leonzio Rizzo & Alberto Zanardi, 2015. "Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 977-998, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:22:y:2015:i:6:p:977-998
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-014-9344-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Umberto Galmarini & Leonzio Rizzo & Alberto Zanardi, 2019. "Switch toward tax centralization in Italy: a wake-up for the local political budget cycle," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(4), pages 872-898, August.
    2. Dalle Nogare, Chiara & Kauder, Björn, 2017. "Term limits for mayors and intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Italian cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-11.
    3. Matteo Gamalerio & Massimo Morelli & Margherita Negri, 2021. "The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21157, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Stefanie Gaebler & Felix Roesel, 2019. "Do direct elections matter? Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(6), pages 1416-1445, December.
    5. Andrea Bonfatti & Lorenzo Forni, 2016. "Do fiscal rules reduce the political cycle? Evidence from Italian municipalities," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0208, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    6. Cipullo, Davide, 2018. "Runoff vs. Plurality: Does It Matter for Expenditures? Evidence from Italy," Working Paper Series 2018:13, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    7. Matteo Gamalerio & Massimo Morelli & Margherita Negri, 2021. "The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21157, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Casarico, Alessandra & Lattanzio, Salvatore & Profeta, Paola, 2022. "Women and local public finance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Bonfatti, Andrea & Forni, Lorenzo, 2019. "Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal budget; Local budget; Single-ballot; Double-ballot; Coalition; Multiple list; Regression discontinuity; H3; H21; H77;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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