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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Author Info

  • Bordignon, Massimo

    ()

    (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

  • Nannicini, Tommaso

    ()

    (Bocconi University)

  • Tabellini, Guido

    ()

    (Bocconi University)

Abstract

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7561.

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Length: 64 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: American Economic Review, 2016, 106 (8), 2349-70
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7561
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Keywords: policy volatility; regression discontinuity design; electoral rules;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General

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  13. Guido Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, 2007. "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice," NBER Technical Working Papers 0337, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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