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Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

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  • Buisseret, Peter

Abstract

I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under non-majoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how non-majoritarian rules can facilitate two-party systems, including those in which the established parties deter the challenger's entry by adopting differentiated platforms. I also show that non-majoritarian run-off rules may facilitate entry deterrence by established parties in settings where a plurality rule cannot. My results provide a striking counterpoint to a conventional wisdom—embodied, most notably, in Duverger's Hypothesis—that associates run-off rules with multi-party systems. Finally, they provide a theoretical foundation for patterns of electoral competition observed in countries using non-majoritarian rules that contradict this conventional wisdom.

Suggested Citation

  • Buisseret, Peter, 2017. "Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 494-506.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:494-506
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2018. "Electoral competition with third party entry in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 121-134.
    2. Alexander Shapoval & Shlomo Weber & Alexei Zakharov, 2019. "Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 713-753, September.
    3. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 341-359, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Run-off; Electoral competition; Entry deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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