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The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting

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  • Brusco, Sandro
  • Dziubiński, Marcin
  • Roy, Jaideep

Abstract

We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize.

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  • Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2012. "The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 447-469.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:447-469
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004
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    8. Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2007. "Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 287-314, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
    2. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2018. "Electoral competition with third party entry in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 121-134.
    3. Ruzica Savcic & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2020. "Apostolic Voting," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 08-2020, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    4. Rahul Swamy & Timothy Murray, 0. "Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-29.
    5. Windsor, Duane, 2013. "Corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility: A positive theory approach," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 1937-1944.
    6. Sophie Bade, 2011. "Divergent Platforms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    7. David Ronayne, 2018. "Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 389-403, September.
    8. Giat, Yahel, 2019. "A location model for boycotting with an application to kosher certification," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1109-1118.
    9. Damien Bol & André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2015. "Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff," Working Papers halshs-01168722, HAL.
    10. Sophie Bade, 2016. "Divergent platforms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(4), pages 561-580, April.
    11. Buisseret, Peter, 2017. "Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 494-506.
    12. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    13. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2014. "Mixed equilibria in runoff elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 619-623.
    14. Joshua Holzer, 2019. "Reevaluating the presidential runoff rule: Does a provision promote the protection of human rights?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(5), pages 1-11, May.
    15. Ruben Durante & Emilio Gutierrez, 2014. "Political Advertising and Voting Intention: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Ads Viewership," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/26lctatf2u8, Sciences Po.
    16. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54, Springer.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Downs; Free entry; Runoff system; Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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