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Reevaluating the presidential runoff rule: Does a provision promote the protection of human rights?

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  • Joshua Holzer

Abstract

In recent years, an increasing number of democracies have adopted a runoff rule to elect their president. Some have argued, however, that the benefits of such a rule are dubious at best. In this article, I seek to counter this claim, as I posit that a runoff rule promotes the protection of human rights by reducing outcomes that are negatively associated with high government respect for human rights. Using ordered logistic regression and an analysis of predicted probabilities, I find that democratic presidential elections held using a runoff rule produce presidents that are less likely to be associated with lower government respect for human rights, and more likely to be associated with greater government respect for human rights. I conclude by suggesting that politicians should consider embracing a presidential runoff rule, as its adoption could be a relatively easy way to reduce repression.

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  • Joshua Holzer, 2019. "Reevaluating the presidential runoff rule: Does a provision promote the protection of human rights?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(5), pages 1-11, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0217650
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0217650
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua Holzer, 2019. "Nationalism and human rights: A replication and extension," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(8), pages 1-9, August.
    2. Joshua Holzer, 2020. "The effect of copartisan justice ministers on human rights in presidential democracies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(9), pages 1-17, September.
    3. Joshua Holzer, 2020. "The effect of two-round presidential elections on human rights," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(12), pages 1-15, December.

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