Centrist's Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints
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- Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2015. "Centrist’S Curse? An Electoral Competition Model With Credibility Constraints," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(05), pages 1-18, December.
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More about this item
KeywordsElectoral competition; plurality; run-off; credibility; spatial models.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-04 (Positive Political Economics)
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