IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v43y1984i3p307-327.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies

Author

Listed:
  • Larry Samuelson

Abstract

We construct a spatial election model in which candidates inherit initial positions in the strategy space, presumably from previous political activity, and they are restricted to strategies close to their initial positions. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. The equilibrium need not entail an expectation of a zero plurality for each candidate. We then apply this model to a sequence of elections in which a series of opposition candidates challenge incumbents. Given certain regularity conditions, the result will be an apparent incumbency advantage, corresponding to that observed in recent congressional elections. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Larry Samuelson, 1984. "Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 307-327, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:3:p:307-327 DOI: 10.1007/BF00118939
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00118939
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:177-181_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:01:p:135-152_23 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. McKelvey, Richard D, 1975. "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(5-6), pages 815-843, Sept.-Nov.
    4. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
    5. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 226-239, April.
    6. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 208-219.
    7. Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1969. "Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-106, September.
    8. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ledyard, John O. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1972. "Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 144-153, April.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:02:p:490-498_14 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Steven Matthews, 1979. "A simple direction model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 141-156, June.
    11. Linda Cohen & Steven Matthews, 1980. "Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 975-986.
    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:66:y:1972:i:04:p:1234-1245_14 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:03:p:617-632_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:03:p:641-650_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:166-176_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Michael D. Intriligator, 1973. "A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 553-560.
    17. repec:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:02:p:426-448_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Gerald H. Kramer & Alvin K. Klevorick, 1974. "Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 539-547.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2015. "History-bound Reelections," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 15/225, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Carmen Beviá & Humberto Llavador, 2009. "The Informational Value of Incumbency," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 773-796, October.
    3. Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2015. "Centrist’S Curse? An Electoral Competition Model With Credibility Constraints," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(05), pages 1-18, December.
    4. Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May.
    5. Dix, Manfred & Santore, Rudy, 2002. "Candidate ability and platform choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 189-194, July.
    6. Buechel, Berno & Klein, Jan, 2014. "Do Consumers' Preferences Really Matter? - A Note on Spatial Competition with Restricted Strategies," MPRA Paper 55288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Berno Buechel & Jan F. Klein, 2016. "Restrictions in Spatial Competition: The Effects on Firms and Consumers," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 157-172, August.
    8. Larry Samuelson, 1987. "A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 141-169, January.
    9. Caselli, Francesco & Cunningham, Tom & Morelli, Massimo & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2012. "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds," CEPR Discussion Papers 8832, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Vote-share Contracts and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Bärbel M. R. Stadler, 1998. "Abstention Causes Bifurcations in Two-Party Voting Dynamics," Working Papers 98-08-072, Santa Fe Institute.
    12. Miller, J. H. & Stadler, P. F., 1998. "The dynamics of locally adaptive parties under spatial voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 171-189, September.
    13. Markus Müller, 2009. "Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/114, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:3:p:307-327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.