Should (and Could) We Ban Prescriptions?
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- Michael Neugart & Matteo G. Richiardi, 2012. "Agent-based models of the labor market," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 125, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
- Iori, G. & Porter, J., 2012. "Agent-Based Modelling for Financial Markets," Working Papers 12/08, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Flavio Lenz-Cesar & Almas Heshmati, 2010. "Agent-based Simulation of Cooperative Innovation," TEMEP Discussion Papers 201052, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Jan 2010.
More about this item
KeywordsNorms; Bans; Liberalism; Anarchy; Strategic voting.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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