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History-bound Reelections

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  • Hans Gersbach

    (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)

Abstract

Often political races are not really competitive, and the path to reelection is smooth for many incumbents. In two-candidate races for office we suggest the introduction of a new re-election rule, which we call the “Score-replication Rule.” This rule requires that, to be reelected, any incumbent has to obtain a percentage of votes that is at least as high as the highest vote-share he/she obtained in any previous election (reduced by some margin). Such a delimiter would restrain negative “incumbency advantages,” and render reelection competitive again. It could also reduce polarization in the United States Congress. Moreover, we suggest how history-bound reelections could be used in European-style proportional election systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2015. "History-bound Reelections," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 15/225, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:15-225
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    History-bound Reelections; Competitive Elections; Incumbency Advantages; Score-replication Rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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