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Contractual Democracy

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  • Gersbach Hans

    (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland and CEPR)

Abstract

Recent contributions suggest that introducing political contracts could make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its fundamental values. Such contracts might foster the public ’s trust in politics. In this article, we review and structure the current state of affairs on Contractual Democracy. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts, and address the major concerns arising with regard to Contractual Democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach Hans, 2012. "Contractual Democracy," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 823-851, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:823-851:n:8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Hans Gersbach, 1998. "On the Equivalence of General and Specific Control in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(5), pages 730-737, May.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Campaigns, political mobility, and communication," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 31-49, October.
    2. Hans Gersbach, 2015. "History-bound Reelections," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 15/225, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    3. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Government Debt-Threshold Contracts," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 444-458, January.
    4. Johannes Gerd Becker & Hans Gersbach, 2013. "A Theory of Threshold Contracts," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 13/182, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada & Maik T. Schneider, 2014. "Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 14/195, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    6. Peter Bernholz, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 265-271, September.
    7. Hans Gersbach & Oriana Ponta, 2017. "Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 289-321, March.
    8. repec:spr:ecogov:v:18:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-017-0195-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hans Gersbach & Philippe Muller & Oriol Tejada, 2015. "Costs of Change, Political Polarization, and Re-election Hurdles," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 15/222, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    10. Gersbach, Hans & Muller, Philippe & Tejada, Oriol, 2016. "The Effects of Higher Re-election Hurdles and Costs of Policy Change on Political Polarization," CEPR Discussion Papers 11375, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2012. "Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 173-192.
    12. Lektauers Arnis & Romanovs Andrejs & Cumiks Aleksejs & Butenko Vitalijs A. & Potrjasaev Semjon, 2013. "Crowdsourcing-based Technique for the Development of Sociotechnical System with Application to the Monitoring of Natural and Technological Objects," Information Technology and Management Science, De Gruyter Open, vol. 16(1), pages 106-113, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law

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