A Theory of Threshold Contracts
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More about this item
Keywordsprincipal-agent model; repeated game; reappointment; stationary Markovian strategies; threshold strategies; threshold contracts; asymmetric information; commitment.;
- C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-10-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2013-10-18 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2013-10-18 (Regulation)
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