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The welfare implications of electoral polarization

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  • Richard Weelden

Abstract

I consider the welfare implications of polarization in the preferences of political candidates, for different distributions of voter preferences, in a model of repeated elections. Candidates care about policy and also have an opportunity to engage in rent-seeking when in office. When candidates’ preferences are polarized they choose non-converging policies if elected. This creates policy costs from not securing re-election, decreasing equilibrium rent-seeking, and, for appropriate parameters, increasing voter welfare. I show that increasing polarization among voters increases the range of parameters for which polarization in candidate preferences is socially optimal if only if utility functions are not too concave. Moreover, with multiple dimensions of policy disagreement, it is optimal to have greater polarization of candidate preferences in dimensions in which voters are more polarized if and only if utility functions are not too concave. I discuss the implications of these results for electoral competition in the United States. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Weelden, 2015. "The welfare implications of electoral polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 653-686, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:653-686
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0874-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Klingelhöfer, 2019. "Competitive Elections, Incumbency Advantage,and Accountability," CFDS Discussion Paper Series 2019/8, Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan, China.
    2. Razvan Vlaicu, 2018. "Inequality, participation, and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 597-624, April.
    3. Câmara, Odilon & Bernhardt, Dan, 2015. "Learning about challengers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 181-206.
    4. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    5. Bierbrauer, Felix & Polborn, Mattias, 2020. "Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote," CEPR Discussion Papers 15401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Dodlova, Marina & Zudenkova, Galina, 2021. "Incumbents’ performance and political extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    7. Nunnari, Salvatore & Zápal, Jan, 2017. "Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 505-534, October.
    8. Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol & Muller, Philippe, 2016. "The Effects of Higher Re-election Hurdles and Costs of Policy Change on Political Polarization," CEPR Discussion Papers 11375, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D72; D60;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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