A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces
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- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
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- Jean Guillaume Forand, 2010. "Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies," Working Papers 1011, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2010.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2008-03-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2008-03-15 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2008-03-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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