A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.
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Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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