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Markovian Elections

Listed author(s):
  • Jean Guillaume Forand

    (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo)

  • John Duggan

    (Department of Economics, University of Rochester)

We establish existence and continuity properties of equilibria in a model of dynamic elections with a discrete (countable) state space and general policies and preferences. We provide conditions under which there is a representative voter in each state, and we give characterization results in terms of the equilibria of an associated “representative voting game.” When the conditions for these results are not met, we provide examples that uncover new classes of dynamic political failures.

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Paper provided by University of Waterloo, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1305.

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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision: Oct 2013
Handle: RePEc:wat:wpaper:1305
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Web page: http://economics.uwaterloo.ca/

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  1. Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006. "Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter," 2006 Meeting Papers 78, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March.
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  5. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
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  8. Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  10. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Political Reputations and Campaign Promises," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 846-884, 06.
  11. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-156, March.
  12. John Duggan, 2012. "Noisy Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 570, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  13. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Banks, Jeffrey & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2003. "Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model," IDEI Working Papers 188, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  15. Battaglini, Marco, 2014. "A dynamic theory of electoral competition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  16. Yehuda (John) Levy, 2012. "A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp596r, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised May 2012.
  17. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2014. "Two-party competition with persistent policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 64-91.
  18. Jose-Victor Rios-Rull & Per Krusell, 1999. "On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1156-1181, December.
  19. Duggan, John & Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2012. "Dynamic legislative policy making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1653-1688.
  20. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1993. "Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1184-1198, December.
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  22. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
  23. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
  24. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov & Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs," 2008 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  25. Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan, 2006. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 285-304, April.
  26. John Duggan, 2012. "Noisy Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2017-2045, 09.
  27. Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 41-68, 02.
  28. John Duggan, "undated". "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Wallis Working Papers WP9, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  29. Bernhardt, Dan & Campuzano, Larissa & Squintani, Francesco & Câmara, Odilon, 2009. "On the benefits of party competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 685-707, July.
  30. Dan Bernhardt & Odilon Câmara & Francesco Squintani, 2011. "Competence and Ideology," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 487-522.
  31. Yehuda (John) Levy, 2012. "A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Equilibria: The Case of Absolutely Continuous Transitions," Discussion Paper Series dp612, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  32. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
  33. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December.
  34. Pierre Yared, 2010. "Politicians, Taxes and Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 806-840.
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