Political reputations and campaign promises
We analyze conditions under which candidates' reputations may affect voters' beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters' strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation. (JEL: D8) (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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| Length: | 78 pages |
| Date of creation: | Dec 2006 |
| Handle: | RePEc:clt:sswopa:1258 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125 Phone: 626 395-4065 Fax: 626 405-9841 Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss Email:
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| Order Information: | Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125 Email: |
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