Political reputations and campaign promises
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Abstract
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Other versions of this item:
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Political Reputations and Campaign Promises," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 846-884, June.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Castañeda Dower, Paul & Pfutze, Tobias, 2015. "Vote suppression and insecure property rights," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-19.
- Böhm, Tobias, 2008. "Essays on Incentives in Public and Private Institutions," Munich Dissertations in Economics 8506, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Javier Rivas, 2016.
"Private agenda and re-election incentives,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 899-915, April.
- Rivas, Javier, 2013. "Private Agenda and Re-Election Incentives," Department of Economics Working Papers 37903, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- repec:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:348-367 is not listed on IDEAS
- Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo Group Munich.
- Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2015.
"Centrist’S Curse? An Electoral Competition Model With Credibility Constraints,"
The Singapore Economic Review (SER),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(05), pages 1-18, December.
- Selim Ergun, 2008. "Centrist's Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints," ThE Papers 08/06, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Carlos Seixas & António Brandão & Manuel Luís Costa, 2013. "Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting," FEP Working Papers 485, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Guido, Cataife, 2007. "The pronouncements of paranoid politicians," MPRA Paper 4473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014.
"The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results,"
Working Papers
1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2015. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1056, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Gari Walkowitz & Arne R. Weiss, 2014. ""Read my Lips!" Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Electoral Competition on Shirking and Trust," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 05-07, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada & Maik T. Schneider, 2014.
"Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies,"
CER-ETH Economics working paper series
14/195, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik & Tejada, Oriol, 2016. "Coalition Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 11492, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:7:p:1824-57 is not listed on IDEAS
- Murtinu, Samuele & Piccirilli, Giulio & Sacchi, Agnese, 2016.
"Fiscal Policy, Government Polarization, and the Economic Literacy of Voters,"
MPRA Paper
74864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Samuele Murtinu & Giulio Piccirilli & Agnese Sacchi, 2016. "Fiscal Policy, Government Polarization, and the Economic Literacy of Voters," Working papers 50, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
- Gersbach Hans, 2012.
"Contractual Democracy,"
Review of Law & Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 823-851, December.
- Gersbach, Hans, 2008. "Contractual Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2012.
"Tax contracts and elections,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 56(7), pages 1461-1479.
- Hans Gersbach & Maik T. Schneider, 2009. "Tax Contracts and Elections," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/123, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik, 2012. "Tax Contracts and Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 9054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean Guillaume Forand & John Duggan, 2013.
"Markovian Elections,"
Working Papers
1305, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2013.
- Jean Guillaume Forand & John Duggan, 2014. "Markovian Elections," 2014 Meeting Papers 153, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ivo Bischoff & Lars-H. Siemers, 2013. "Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 163-180, July.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2006-12-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2006-12-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-12-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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